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DeWitt: Employment Discrimination Law

NOTE
DEFINING EMPLOYER LIABILITY:
TOWARD A PRECISE
APPLICATION OF AGENCY
PRINCIPLES IN TITLE VII
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
"[I]n spite of whatever social enlightenment our nation might
have achieved in the wake of the civil rights movement, the
various anti-discrimination laws enacted by [C]ongress, and
such consciousness raising events in our nation's history as the
Anita Hill / Clarence Thomas hearings, the nation's workplaces
are still filled with those who are eager to exploit their positions
of authority and act motivated by discriminatory animus.,,1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Kimberly Ellerth sued Burlington Industries, Inc. (hereinafter "Burlington") for sexual harassment based on the actions of
her supervisor, Ted Slowik. 2 Ellerth brought her claims under

1. Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(Castillo, J.), rev'd, 102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 123 F.3d
490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) [hereinafter "Ellerth In).
2. See id. at 1105-1106. Slowik was not Ellerth's immediate supervisor.
Throughout her employment at Burlington, Ellerth reported to a supervisor in
Burlington's Chicago office. Her immediate supervisors, in turn, reported to Slowik.
[d. at 1106.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Burlington's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Ellerth's
claims with prejudice. 4
Ellerth appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. 5 The panel reversed the district court's
decision. 6 Burlington moved for a rehearing en banc, which·
was granted. 7 On rehearing, a majority of the court agreed
that Ellerth presented enough evidence to survive summary
judgment on a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. 8
Burlington then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. 9 The Supreme Court granted review to resolve differing
views among the federal courts and to establish a standard for
employer liability in sexual harassment cases. 10 The Court
held that, even in cases where the employee did not suffer a
tangible employment action, the employer is vicariously liable
unless it can establish an affirmative defense. 11 The Court defined the affirmative defense as a two-element test. 12 The first
element requires the employer to prove it took reasonable action to prevent and correct the harassment. 13 If it did, the second element requires the employer to prove that the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective measures
available to her. 14 If the employer proves both elements of the

3. See id. at 1105.
4. See id. at 1124.
5. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated en
bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) [hereinafter "Ellerth WJ.
6. See id. at 863.
7. See id.
8. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (per curiam) [hereinafter "Ellerth III"). Ellerth waived her claim of hostile
environment harassment on her appeal. The grant of summary judgment dismissing
Ellerth's claim for hostile environment was therefore affirmed. Id.
9. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998).
10. See id. at 2264.
11. See id. at 2270.
12. See id.
13. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
14. See id. For ease of reference and because women are overwhelmingly the
victims of sexual harassment, this note will use feminine pronouns to refer to plaintiffs
in general. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
28 (1979).
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defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it will not be held
vicariously liable. 15
Section II of this note discusses applicable principles and
law in sexual harassment cases, including Title VII, Equal
EmploYment Opportunity Commission Guidelines, agency
principles, and case law that illustrate two primary approaches
taken by the courts in determining the standard for employer
liability. This section also discusses relevant portions of the
first Supreme Court case to address sexual harassment under
Title VII. Section III discusses the facts that gave rise to EIlerth's sexual harassment claims. Section IV discusses the procedural history of Ellerth's case, including the district court's
decision, the decision of the Seventh Circuit panel that heard
Ellerth's appeal and the en banc decision of the Seventh Circuit. Section V discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in Ellerth v. Burlington Industries in the context of sexual harassinent law under Title VII. Section VI offers a critique of the
Supreme Court's analysis, asserting that it is inconsistent with
agency principles. Finally, Section VII concludes that a brightline standard of employer liability, based on agency principles,
.is necessary in Title VII sexual harassment cases.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII

Congress enacted Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (hereinafter ''Title VII" or "the Act").16 Title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating against a person because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin}7 Prohibited discrimination may include termination, refusal to hire, or any

15. See id.
16. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
17. See 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)( 1):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
[d.
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other practice which alters a person's "compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment."18 Title VII also forbids
segregation and discriminatory classification of workers when
these practices adversely impact the status of the employee. 19
Finally, Title VII prohibits practices that explicitly discriminate against workers as well as those that are facially neutral
but have a discriminatory effect. 20
Courts recognized sexual harassment as discrimination under Title VII by drawing an analogy to race-based harassment. 21 Like the use of racial epithets by co-workers, harassment based on sex is a barrier to equality in the workplace. 22
This argument is rooted in the language of Title VII itself. 23
The "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" include
the right to work in an environment that is free from the psychologically harmful effects of discrimination. 24
B.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM:ISSION

GUIDELINES

Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to effectuate the provisions of Title VII. 25
In this capacity, the EEOC receives complaints from victims of
employment discrimination. 26 In order to assist in the investigation of victims' claims of discrimination, the EEOC developed
guidelines defIning the conduct that constitutes sexual har-

18. Id.
19. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit,
segregate, or classiJY his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
20. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 230 (1971).
21. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
22. See id.
23. See 42 U.s.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
24. Henson, 682 F.2d at 901 (quoting 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a)(l)).
25. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a). "The commission is empowered, as hereinafter
provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practices
as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title." Id:
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
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assment under Title VII, as well as the role of the employer in
preventing and correcting sexual harassment in the work
place. 27 The guidelines describe the EEOC's standards for assessing employee claims of work place harassment. 28 The
guidelines are not binding on the COurtS.29 However, courts
and litigants properly rely upon the guidelines because they
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment" that
can be useful in deciding sexual harassment cases. 3O
In evaluating claims of work place harassment, the guidelines instruct the EEOC to examine the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether sexual harassment has occurred. 31 The "totality of the circumstances" includes the nature of the conduct as well as the facts surrounding the conduct. 32 Accordingly, the guidelines describe conduct that
amounts to sexual harassment as well as the circumstances
that may give rise to a finding of sexual harassment. 33 Prohibited conduct includes "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature.'>34
After identifying the types of prohibited conduct, the guidelines go on to describe three situations in which such conduct
amounts to sexual harassment. 35 First, sexual harassment
arises when the employee's submission to the advances is made
a term or condition of employment. 36 Second, sexual harassment occurs when the employee's submission, or the lack of it,

27. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(b).
29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
30. [d. (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141·142 (1976)).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b):
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred. The legality of a particular action will
be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.

[d.
32.

[d.

33.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).

34.

[d.

35.
36.

See id.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(l). "[Slubmission to such conduct is made either

explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment." [d.
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is the basis of employment decisions affecting the employee. 37
These are commonly known as "quid pro quo" sexual harassment.38 Third, sexual harassment arises when conduct "has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment. "39 This form of harassment
is commonly known as "hostile environment" sexual harassment. 40
Regardless of which of the three types of harassment a
plaintiff claims or whether the harassment results in a tangible
employment action, the guidelines state that employers are
vicariously liable for sexual harassment when it is committed
by a supervisor. 41 Thus, even when employers forbid sexual
harassment, the employer is vicariously liable for a supervi:'
sor's harassment. 42 Moreover, an employer will be vicariously
liable even when it did not know that sexual harassment occurred. 43
The strict vicarious liability approach outlined above has
not prevailed in most courts, in part because the EEOC, then
headed by Clarence Thomas, shifted its position. 44 Thomas
urged Solicitor General Charles Fried to submit an amicus
brief to the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,45 the fIrst sexual harassment case decided by the Su-

37. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11{a)(2). "[S]ubmission to or rejection of such conduct by
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual."
[d.
38. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11{a)(3).
40. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
41. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c). Some commentators refer to this as "strict
vicarious liability" because the imposition of vicarious (as opposed to direct liability
based on employer negligence) liability is strict. Vicarious liability is imposed in all
cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer,
Professor of Law at Golden Gate University School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal.
(October 27, 1998).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability
of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed By Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 124 (1995) (citing David G. Savage, Thomas Fought Workplace Harassment, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at A6).
45. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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preme COurt. 46 In the brief, the Solicitor General urged that
the appropriate standard for imposing liability on employers
for a hostile work environment should be negligence. 47 Thus,
whether an employer has a sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure, combined with the harassment victim's failure to use them, should insulate an employer from vicarious
liability. 48 The Meritor Court relied heavily on that reasoning
to conclude that agency principles limited employer liability. 49
Since then, the guidelines' strict vicarious liability standard
has been imposed in some circuits, but not in others, and has
not been followed by the Supreme Court. 50

C.

AGENCY PRINCIPLES AND SEXUAL HARAsSMENT

1.
The Rationale for Applying Agency Principles to Sexual
Harassment
Congress intended agency principles to determine the standard of employer liability under Title VII. 51 Additionally, the
Supreme Court relied on Title VII's defInition of an "employer,"

46. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae at 10·13, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
(No. 84·1979); Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 122 (stating that Meritor was the
Supreme Court's first opportunity to address sexual harassment under Title VII).
47. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae at 6-7 (stating that employer liability depended on
whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
provide appropriate redress).
48. See id. at 26. This position directly contradicts the 1980 EEOC guidelines.
See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(c) (stating that an employer's policy against sexual harassment
and/or knowledge of sexual harassment in the workplace do defeat vicarious liability).
49. See Meritor, 477 U.s. at 71-72 (quoting extensively from the amicus brief and
stating that it was appropriate to consider the circumstances of each case rather than
impose a bright-line rule). The Court stated in the next paragraph that agency
principles limited employer liability. See id.
50. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae at 10-13, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
(No. 84-1979).
51. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(b). "The term employer means a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agents of such a person." See also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(c) ( "Applying general Title VII principles, an employer ... is responsible for its
acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment .... " ).
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including language like the "agents of such a person," to support its use of agency principles in deciding discrimination
cases. 52 Accordingly, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the
Court suggested that the Restatement (Second) Agency, section
219 (hereinafter "Section 219") was a useful starting place for
determining whether an employer should be liable for sexual
harassment.53

2.

Applying Section 219 to Sexual Harassment

Agency principles apply to workplace sexual harassment because they describe employers' responsibilities arising out of
the injurious conduct of their employees. 54 Therefore, a proper
interpretation of common law agency principles is essential to
formulating the correct rule for employer liability in sexual
harassment cases. 55
Section 219 describes several situations in which an employer may be liable for the torts of his employee. 56 Generally,
an employer is liable for injuries caused by an employee while
he is acting within the scope of his employment. 57 The assumption underlying this rule is that an employer can control an
employee's conduct when the employee is acting within the
scope of his service to the employer. 58 Because the employer
exercises such control, it is responsible for harm that results
from the employee's conduct. 59

52. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
53. See id.
54. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 77.
55. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 141.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
57. See id. For ease of reference, and because harassers are often male
supervisors, masculine pronouns will be used to refer to supervisors. See MACKINNON,
supra note 14, at 28 (1979) (citing the Working Women United Survey. Of 155 women
surveyed, forty percent were harassed by their male supervisors). The Restatement
defmes scope of employment as follows: "1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of
employment if, but only if: a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; b) it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits; c) it is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master, and d) if force is intentionally used by the
servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957).
.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) cmt. a (1957).
59. See id. The classic example is where the driver of a delivery vehicle causes an
auto accident while he is making deliveries. Because the driver was doing his job
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The Restatement also describes four situations in which
employers may be liable for an employee's acts that occur outside the scope of his or her employment. 60 First, employers may
be liable when they intended the employee to harm so~eone. 61
Second, employers may be liable when they are themselves
negligent or reckless. 62 Third, employers may be liable when
the employee's conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the
employer. 63 The comments to the Restatement describe these
three categories as situations in which employers are either
guilty of tortious conduct or are legally responsible for the employee's tortious conduct. 64
The fourth situation described in Section 219 is different because the employers are not themselves guilty of tortious conduct. 65 Rather, the employer is vicariously liable based on his
relationship with the employee. 66 This standard encompasses
two distinct, but related situations. 67 In the first, employers
may be liable when their employee acts or speaks on behalf of

(driving) at the time of the accident, his employer can be liable for the plaintiffs
injuries. The rationale is that the employer can control the competence of drivers when
their conduct (driving) is within the scope (time period, duties) of their employment.
See id.
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a) (1957). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 cmt a. (1957). This rule comes from tort law,
which holds people liable for the acts of others when they cause and intend an act or
result. For an example, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 illus. 1 (1957):
the employer tells his employee to shoot anyone who enters his property. A customer
rightfully enters the property and the employee shoots him. The employer is liable
because he intended the act and/or the consequences. See id.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1957). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. d (1957). For example, an employer
may be liable for his negligence or recklessness when he hires someone that he has
reason to believe will harm others. See id. This is direct, as opposed to vicarious,
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) cmt. e (1957).
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(c) (1957). A non-delegable
duty is a kind of vicarious liability, where a statute, contract, charter or franchise, or
the common law imposes a duty on an employer. The employer may not delegate his
responsibilities under this duty to someone else, like an agent or contractor. A classic
example is the duty of common carriers to transport their passengers safely. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 70 at 511 (5th ed.
1984).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) cmt. e (1957).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(d) (1957).
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the employer and someone else relied on this "apparent
authority.'>68 In the second, employers may be liable if the employee was "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency relation. "69 Either of these situations may provide a
basis for employer liability.70 In other words, under a correct
reading of agency principles, a plaintiff does not have to prove
the existence of both sets of circumstances. 71
The two situations are related because there is a certain degree of overlap between them.72 For example, a supervisor may
sexually harass a subordinate, asserting that he has the
authority to terminate her if she does not submit. 73 Believing
that he has this authority, she submits to avoid being terminated. 74 In that situation, the supervisor has asserted his
authority to terminate the victim, whether he has it (actual
authority) or not (apparent authority).75 The fact that he is, in
fact, a supervisor and he used his status to perpetuate the harassment may also give rise to liability based on the agency relation standard because he could not have perpetuated the
harassment if he was not a supervisor.76

D.

SEXUAL HARAsSMENT CASE LAW

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ellerth, the federal
courts could not agree on how to determine employer liability
in sexual harassment cases. 77 In some cases, the court determined that the standard of employer liability hinged on
whether the victim claimed quid pro quo or hostile environment harassment. 78 In other cases, however, the court imposed

68. [d.
69. [d.
70. See id. The Restatement uses the disjunctive: "... or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." [d.
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(d) (1957).
72. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 861-862.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 861-862.
76. See id.
77. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 131.
78. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. "In the classic quid pro quo case an employer is
strictly liable for the conduct of its supervisors, while in the [hostile) work environment
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vicarious liability to both quid pro quo and hostile environment
claims. 79 The Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson did not articulate a bright-line standard,
so the conflict summarized above continued after the Meritor
decision. 80
Before and after Meritor, sexual harassment was actionable
under Title VII in two general forms; quid pro quo harassment
and hostile environment harassment. 81 Quid pro quo harassment occurred when a supervisor relied on his authority to require sexual favors from employees. 82 If the employee refused,
the supervisor exercised his power to terminate or discipline
the employee. 83 A tangible employment action was the defming
feature of the quid pro quo type of harassment. 84 Plaintiffs
could not claim quid pro quo harassment unless they could
prove a tangible employment action, such as termination or a
disciplinary action. 85
Hostile environment harassment, in contrast, was a situation in which the victim "[ran] a gauntlet of sexual abuse."86
The victim typically did not suffer a tangible employment action, such as demotion or termination, but the treatment she
endured substantially altered her working conditions. 87 For
example, the victim may have been so distraught by the harasser's conduct that she missed work. 88 As a rule, the "mere
utterance" of a sexual remark was not enough to alter the victim's working conditions. 89 Rather, the plaintiff must have suf-

case, the plaintiff must prove that higher management knew or should have known of
the sexual harassment before the employer may be held liable." [d.
79. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,780 (2d Cir. 1994).
80. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 131. Meritor was the Supreme Court's
first opportunity to address sexual harassment under Title VII.
81. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
86. [d. at 902.
87. See id.
88. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
89. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1972)).
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fered severe or pervasive harassment to' claim hostile work environment harassment under Title VII. 90

1.
Henson v. City of Dundee: Employer Liability Depends on
Type of Claim
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was one of the first federal circuits to address the issue of
whether sexual harassment constituted discrimination under
Title VII.91 In Henson v. City of Dundee 92 , the plaintiff, Barbara Henson, was a dispatcher for the city of Dundee's police
department. 93 After working there for two years, she quit and
sued the city of Dundee for sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII.94 She claimed that her supervisor, John Sellgren,
sexually harassed her by refusing to promote her unless she
engaged in sexual activity with him, and that he created a hostile work environment. 95
Because Henson claimed both quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment, the court addressed employer liability as
to both types of claims. 96 The court stated that the type of harassment the victim claimed determined whether an employer
would be vicariously liable. 97 According to the Henson court, in
quid pro quo cases it was appropriate to find the employer vicariously liable because the supervisor misused the authority
delegated to him by the employer. 98 Thus, the employer's liability derived from the agency relationship. 99
In contrast, the employer's liability for creating a sexually
hostile work environment derived from its own negligence in

90.
91.
92.
93.

See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
See Henson, 682 F.2d 897.
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 899.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 899-900. Henson claimed both quid pro quo harassment based on
the supervisor's refusal to promote and a hostile work environment consisting of severe
or pervasive sexual harassment. See id.
96. See id. at 910.
97. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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failing to correct the harassment. loo The court held that direct
liability, rather than vicarious liability, was the appropriate
standard in hostile environment cases because the supervisor
acted outside the scope of his authority in harassing the employee-victim.101 The reason for the difference in treatment was
that, in a hostile work environment case, unlike a quid pro quo
case, the supervisor did not misuse the authority delegated to
him by the employer to take action against the employees that
report to him. 102 Instead, he acted according to his own intentions, not those of the employer. 103 Moreover, the court noted
that any person in the workplace is capable of creating a hostile work environment for another employee. 104 The ability to
fill a work environment with sexual innuendoes and insults
does not depend on the amount of authority the employer
grants to the individual. 105 Thus, co-employee harassment, as
opposed to harassment by a supervisor, does not subject the
employer to vicarious liability.l06 The same conduct by a supervisor, because it can happen regardless of the harasser's position, is also not subject to vicarious liability. 107

2.
Karibian v. Columbia University: Employer Liability
Does Not Depend on the Type of Claim
In Karibian v. Columbia University,l08 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the defendant
employer vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by one of its supervisors.l09 Sharon Karibian worked in
Columbia University's fundraising office. 110 She worked there
for three years, until the office closed in 1990. III Mark Urban
was the Development Officer for Annual Giving and supervised

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
See id.
See id.
14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780.
See id. at 775.
See id. at 775-776.
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the office. 112 From the beginning of her employment, Urban
pressured Karibian to engage in sexual activity with him. 113
After leaving the university, Karibian sued under Title VII for
sex discrimination, asserting both hostile environment and
quid pro quo sexual harassment claims. 114
In stark contrast to the Henson approach, the Karibian
court's imposition of vicarious liability did not depend on
whether the plaintiff claimed quid pro quo or hostile environment harassment. 115 The court reasoned that it was inappropriate to apply different standards of employer liability to quid
pro quo and hostile environment claims because the conduct of
the supervisor is essentially the same in both situations. 116
Instead, the court dermed two standards for vicarious liability
that followed traditional agency principles. 117
Thus, under the Karibian court's approach, when a supervisor created a sexually hostile work environment, the employer
was liable in either of the following two situations. 118 First, the
employer was liable if the supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment. 119 An example of this
comes from the facts of Karibian itself. 120 There, Karibian's
working conditions varied noticeably depending on her response to Urban; for example, whether she received raises or
promotions depended on whether she had been receptive to his
advances. 121 Second, the employer was liable if the agency relationship helped the supervisor create the hostile work environment. l22 Again, the facts of Karibian illustrate this rule. 123
112. See id. at 775.
113. See Karibian. 14 F.3d at 776.
114. See id. at 776·777.
115. See id. at 781.
116. See id. The court stated that "it would be a jarring anomaly to hold that
conduct which always renders an employer liable under a quid pro quo theory does not
result in liability to the employer when that same conduct becomes so severe and
pervasive as to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment." [d. (emphasis
added).
117. See Karibian. 14 F.3d at 780.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 778.
121. See Karibian. 14 F.3d at 778.
122. See id. at 780.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss2/4

14

DeWitt: Employment Discrimination Law

1999]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

249

Karibian claimed that Urban used his authority as a supervisor to force her into an abusive sexual relationship. 124 Presumably, she would not have submitted had he not been her
supervisor. 125
The Karibian court then applied the rule to the facts of the
case. The plaintiffs continued advancement at Columbia depended on her response to her supervisor's advances, satisfying
the classic quid pro quo requirements. 126 The fact that she did
advance, and was not terminated, illustrated the court's point
that actual economic loss was not necessary to a quid pro quo
claim. l27 In addition, Urban's repeated advances, remarks,
threats, and innuendoes also created a hostile working environment. l28 The Court found that, given Urban's authority to
promote and terminate Karibian, the university was liable for
his creation of a hostile work environment. 129

3.
The Supreme Court Declined to Establish a Bright-Line
Standard for Employer Liability
The Supreme Court discussed sexual harassment under Title VII for the first time in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. l30
Mechelle Vinson sued her former employer, Meritor Savings
B~, for sexual harassment committed by her. supervisor,
Sydney Taylor. 131 One of the key issues was whether hostile
environment harassment was actionable under Title VII. 132
The Court held that it was, and went on to discuss standards of
employer liability for sexual harassment. 133

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id.
See id.
See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780.
See id. at 778.
See id.
See id. at 780.
See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780.
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
See id. at 60.
See id. at 64.
See id. at 66-73.
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The Court began by stating that agency principles determine the standard for employer liability.l34 According to the
Court, vicarious liability for sexual harassment was most
clearly appropriate when a supervisor "exercise[d] the authority actually delegated to him by his employer."I35 Thus, when a
supervisor made decisions that changed an employees status,
those decisions could be imputed to the employer. 136 In the context of discrimination, a supervisor's decision to terminate an
employee based on his or her gender would be imputed to the
employer. 137
However, Vinson's supervisor did not terminate her because
of her sex or refusal of his sexual demands. l36 Rather, his persistent advances created a hostile working environment. 139 In
such a case, the Court stated, the usual agency rule does not
apply. 140 Unfortunately, the Court did not state an alternative
rule. 141 Instead, it instructed the courts to rely on the common
law of agency in determining a standard for employer liability.142 The Court further cautioned the lower courts that
agency principles limited, rather than expanded, employer liability. 143
Since the Meritor court declined to articulate a bright-line
standard, courts have been unclear as to the appropriate standard for employer liability.144 Indeed, courts have taken varied
approaches both before and after Meritor, underscoring the

134. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70.
135. [d.
136. See id. This is commonly known as the scope of employment rule. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) cmt. 1 (1957).
137. See id.
138. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. Vinson was terminated for excessive use of sick
leave. See id.
139. See id. at 64.
140. See id. at 70.
141. See id. at 72.
142. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
143. See id. This statement has been criticized as dictum. See Oppenheimer, supra
note 44, at 131. Moreover, after Meritor, not all of the circuits read agency principles to
limit employer liability. See e.g. Karibian, 14 F.3d 773 (imposing vicarious liability for
hostile environment harassment, where the supervisor used his delegated authority to
perpetuate a hostile work environment).
144. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
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need for a clear standard of employer liability.145 Thus, in Ellerth, the Supreme Court sought to articulate the agency
analysis in sexual harassment cases and the rule for imposing
vicarious liability which subsequent courts could follow. 146
III.

FACTS OF ELLERTH

Kimberly Ellerth met Ted Slowik in March of 1993 during
her second interview for a merchandizing assistant position at
Burlington. 147 On this occasion, Slowik made the first of many
remarks that Ellerth found offensive. 148 Specifically, he asked
her if she was married, whether she was planning to have children, and whether she and her husband were "practicing" to
have children. 149 Slowik also stared at her in a sexual way
throughout the interview, which made her feel uncomfortable. l50
Despite Slowik's conduct during the interview, Ellerth later
sent a letter to Mary Fitzgerald thanking her for the opportunity to meet with Slowik and stating, "[t]he insight he gave me
into the position only provided me with more incentive to take
the job .... "151 About one week after Ellerth's interview with
Slowik, Fitzgerald offered her the job and she accepted. 152
Ellerth assisted Fitzgerald in Burlington's Chicago office. l53
Fitzgerald, in turn, reported to Slowik, who worked in the New
York office. l54 Despite working in different offices and the geo-

145. See discussion supra Part II.D.
146. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
147. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1106. Ellerth's first
interview was with Mary Fitzgerald, who would be one of Ellerth's supervisors in the
Chicago office. Slowik was the vice president of sales and marketing for Burlington's
House Mattress Ticking division. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1106.
152. See id.
153. See id. Ellerth assisted Fitzgerald with her day to day activities. Fitzgerald
was Ellerth's immediate supervisor; Fitzgerald reported to Slowik. See id.
154. See id.
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graphical distance between Slowik and Ellerth, Slowik's inappropriate behavior toward her continued. 155
Ellerth traveled frequently as part of her job, primarily for
training purposes. 156 Her travel took her to New York, San
Francisco, and North Carolina. 157 Ellerth encountered Slowik
during some of these tripS.I58 For example, when Ellerth was in
North Carolina for training, she met with Slowik, another sales
representative, and his wife for dinner.159 Slowik was loud and
obnoxious during dinner. ISO Ellerth recalled that he had been
rude to the waitress, and that she was offended by his conduct. 161 After dinner, Ellerth and Slowik went back to the hotel
in which they were staying. 162 He invited her to accompany
him to the hotel bar, where an all-women band was playing
music, and she accepted. l63 Slowik commented favorably on the
band members' legs, breasts, and revealing outfits. l64 He then
turned to Ellerth and said that she was "a little lacking in that
area," referring to her breasts. 165 Ellerth was offended, but did
. not reply to his remarks. l66 When she did not respond, Slowik
told her that she should ''loosen up. "167 As Slowik left the bar,
he told her, "You know, Kim, I could make your life very hard
or very easy at Burlington."I68 Ellerth took this as a threat,

155. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1106-1109.
156. See id. at 1106.
157. See id. at 1106-1108. During one of the San Francisco trips, at a bedding
conference, Ellerth saw Slowik often, but he largely ignored her. On the last day of the
conference, however, Slowik commented on Ellerth's "ass" while staring at her rear.
Ellerth was so upset that she ran to the bathroom and cried. Id. at 1108.
158. See id.
159. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107.
160. See id.
161. See id. Although Ellerth could not recall Slowik's specific remarks to and
about the waitress, Ellerth stated that she was probably offended because the remarks
were of a sexual nature. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107.
164. See id.
165. Id. Slowik had been staring at Ellerth's breasts and legs throughout this
encounter. See id.
166. See id.
167. Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107.
168. Id.
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meaning she would have to have sex with Slowik to keep her
job!69
In the summer of 1993, Ellerth went to New York for
training. 170 At one point during her trip, Ellerth had lunch
with Slowik and Angelo Brenna, another Burlington Vice
President. 171 During lunch, Slowik told sexual jokes and
rubbed Ellerth's knee under the table. 172 Ellerth moved her leg
away from Slowik's hand but said nothing.173 She did not think
Brenna was aware of the incident. 174 After lunch, in Ellerth's
presence, Slowik commented on Ellerth's legs to Brenna. 175
Slowik also traveled regularly to Burlington's Chicago office,
where Ellerth would encounter him.176 In the fall of 1993,
Slowik was in the Chicago office and saw Ellerth helping another employee fold fabric samples. 177 He said, "[o]n your knees
again, Kim?"178 Ellerth was offended, believing that Slowik's
comment referred to oral sex.179 On another of Slowik's visits to
Chicago, Ellerth found Slowik sitting at her desk making a
telephone call. ISO He said to her, "[i]t's nice to have my butt
where your butt was, Kim."181
In December 1993, Ellerth and her husband encountered
Slowik at Burlington's Christmas party.182 Slowik remarked to
Ellerth's husband that he was "a lucky man to have a woman
like that. "183 Ellerth observed this encounter and assumed that

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
Slowik,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id.
See id. at 1106.
See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1106.
See id. at 1107.
See id.
See id.
See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107.
See id. at 1106. "Throughout her employment at Burlington, Ellerth saw
[in Chicago] on average, for a day or two every month or two." ld.
See id. at 1107-1108.
ld. at 1108.
See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108.
See id.
ld.
See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1108.
ld.
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Slowik was referring to her.l84 Ellerth also claimed that Slowik
patted her rear during this party. 185
In addition to their face to face encounters, Slowik made inappropriate comments to Ellerth during their weekly telephone
conversations. l86 On two occasions, Slowik asked Ellerth what
she was wearing. 187 On the first occasion, Ellerth had contacted Slowik to get his approval on a customer's order.l88 He
refused to give his approval, stating, "I don't have time for you
right now Kim, unless you're telling me - unless you want to
tell me what you are wearing. "189 On the second occasion, EIlerth had called Slowik again to get his approval on the same
order.l90 He denied approval for the second time. 191 During this
conversation, Slowik asked, "[a]re you wearing shorter skirts
yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot
easier. "192
Slowik made many other remarks during his conversations
with Ellerth. l93 Once, Slowik told an offensive joke: "[w]hat is
the difference between a blonde and a limo? Not everyone has
been in a limO."194 To Ellerth, who is blonde, this joke implied
that she was promiscuous. 195 During several other conversations, Slowik commented on Ellerth's legs. l96 His remarks included: "[b]ow are those legs of yours, Kim?" and "lilt must be

184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108.
187. See id. at 1109.
188. See id. at 1108-1109.
189. Id. at 1109.
190. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108. Ellerth claims that this follow-up
telephone call occurred 1-2 days after her initial call to obtain permission for the
customer's order. See Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Appendix,
Exhibit C at 257:11, Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (No. 95 C 0839).
191. See id. at 1109.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108.
195. See id. at 1115. See David G. Savage, Changing Rules on the Job, ABA J.,
Aug. 1998 at 43 (a photograph of Kimberly Ellerth reveals that she is blonde).
196. See id. at 1108.
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hard for a woman like you, Kim, to have a job like that-a
woman with great legs. "197

In March of 1994, Slowik interviewed Ellerth for a promotion. 198 During the interview, he rubbed her knee and voiced a
concern about promoting her because she was "not loose
enough.nI99 Despite Slowik's "hesitation," Ellerth received the
promotion.2OO
Two months after she received the promotion, Patrick Lawrence, Ellerth's new supervisor, received complaints about her
from customers and other employees. 201 Lawrence sent Ellerth
a memorandum regarding the complaints on May 22, 1994. 202
In his memorandum, Lawrence stated that two customers and
three Burlington employees complained that Ellerth had failed
to return their telephone calls. 203
On May 31, 1994, Ellerth informed Lawrence that she was
quitting.204 At that time, she did not state that the reason she
quit was Slowik's harassing behavior.205 However, on June 21,
1994, three weeks after leaving Burlington, Ellerth wrote a

197. Id. at 1108.
198. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1108.
199. Id. Slowik said that he had hesitations about promoting Ellerth because she
was "arrogant" and not "loose enough" for him. Slowik also stated that he had voiced
this concern to other people at Burlington. When describing the travel requirements of
the new position, Slowik asked Ellerth whether her husband would miss her when she
was away. Id.
200. See id. Ellerth was promoted to Sales Representative. Patrick Lawrence
became her immediate supervisor. He reported to Slowik. See id. at 1106.
201. See id. at 1109. Burlington's Customer Service Manager, Donna Thibideau,
also received complaints about Ellerth. See id.
202. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1109.
203. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 1996),
vacated en bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
204. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. Ellerth informed Lawrence of her
resignation by both telephone and fax. See id.
205. See id. Ellerth said that when she wrote the first letter to Lawrence she
initially included, as one of her reasons, a statement about Slowik's behavior. She
deleted that statement, on her husband's advice, before faxing the letter to Lawrence.
See id.
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letter to Lawrence stating that she had quit because of Slowik's
harassing behavior. 206
Throughout Ellerth's employment, Burlington had a policy
forbidding sexual harassment.207 Ellerth was aware of the policy and had a copy of the employee handbook, which contained
a statement of the policy.208 Ellerth's husband advised her that
complaining might jeopardize her job. 209 Furthermore, Ellerth
was not aware of how vigilantly the policy was enforced, or if it
was enforced at all. 210 Ellerth knew that Lawrence, as her supervisor, had a duty to report complaints of sexual harassment
and Ellerth was afraid Slowik would make her job more difficult if he knew that she had complained. 211 Therefore, Ellerth
felt her job would be in jeopardy if she complained to Lawrence. 212 Ellerth alleged that she told several employees and
one Burlington customer about Slowik's behavior.213 However,
each person denied having had a conversation with Ellerth in
which she complained of sexual harassment. 214

See id.
See id. at 1118. The policy states, in pertinent part: "The Company will not
tolerate any form of sexual harassment in the workplace... If you have any questions
20S.

207.

or problems, or if you feel you have been discriminated against, you are encouraged to
talk with your supervisor or human resources representative or use the grievance
procedure promptly." Id.
208. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1109.

209.
210.

See id.
See id. at 1108. The district court found this assertion insufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material filct, which is necessary to survive summary judgment. See
id.
211. See id. at 1109.
212. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. The facts do not' indicate whether
Lawrence would have had to tell Slowik that Ellerth had complained.
213. See id. at 1118 n.12. Ellerth alleged that she complained to Donna Thibideau,
a customer service manager, between January and March 1994, Sherry Hester and
Laura Peffal, both customer service representatives, Patrick Crosson, a sales
representative, and Car a Jimenez, a Burlington customer.
None of the other
employees was a supervisor. See id.
214. See id. at 1109 n.S. Although each of the people Ellerth complained to denied
having such a conversation with her, the district court assumed her allegations to be
true. Because the court was determining whether to grant summary judgment to the
defendant, it evaluated the facts in the light most favorable to Ellerth. See id.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF ELLERTH

A. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
On October 12, 1994, Ellerth filed complaints with the
EEOC and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. 215 The
EEOC issued a right to sue letter on November 30, 1994, and
Ellerth subsequently sued Burlington in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 216 In her suit,
Ellerth claimed sex discrimination and constructive discharge
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.217 Ellerth's suit alleged that Slowik inappropriately touched her and that he created a hostile work
environment.218 She further alleged that Slowik's conduct resulted in her constructive discharge. 219

Burlington moved for summary judgment, which the district
court granted 220 The court did not doubt that Slowik subjected
Ellerth to a hostile work environment. 221 The court concluded,
however, that Burlington could not be liable for Slowik's conduct under Title VII because Ellerth could not prove Burling-

215. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 1996),
vacated en bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
216. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 853. The EEOC may issue a right to sue letter to a
complainant at any of several points during the complaint process. A right to sue letter
simply indicates that a complainant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies.
Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ. School
of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 19, 1999).
217. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101,1105 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
218. See id. A hostile work environment is one in which sexual harassment has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the victim's work environment or job
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. To be
actionable under Title VII, sexual harassment must be severe or pervasive such that it
alters the conditions of the victim's employment. The court considered four factors:
frequency, severity, whether the supervisor's conduct was physically threatening or
humiliating, and whether the supervisor's conduct unreasonably interfered with the
victim's work performance. See id. at 1110.
219. See id. at 1124. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer "makes an
employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an
involuntary resignation." ld. Constructive discharge, in this context, requires that the
employer know about abusive working conditions and fail to resolve the problem. See
id.
220. See id.
221. See Ellerth l, 912 F. Supp. at 1114.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4

258 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:235
ton's liability under any of the three agency principles it applied. 222
Under the fIrst theory of liability, Burlington would be vicariously liable if Slowik's actions were within the scope of his
employment. 223 The district court found that an employer is not
vicariously liable for the supervisor's acts if the supervisor's
intent is ''too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master."224 In this case, the court found no evidence indicating that
Slowik's conduct was motivated in any way by a purpose to
serve Burlington.225 Therefore, the court concluded, Burlington
could not be held liable under this theory. 226
Under the second theory of liability, Burlington would be liable for acts committed outside the scope of Slowik's employment if Burlington was negligent or reckless. 227 Negligence and
recklessness require that Burlington knew or should have
known about the harassment. 228 Once Burlington discovered
the hostile work environment, it had a duty to take reasonable
steps to correct the harassment.229 The court noted that this is
the most common basis relied upon in sexual harassment
cases.230 In this case, because Ellerth never informed her supervisor, or anyone else in authority, of Slowik's behavior,
Burlington never actually knew of Slowik's conduct and could

222. See id. at 1123. In Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that agency principles determine when an employer is vicariously
liable for sexual harassment. Accordingly, the District Court applied agency principles
to determine whether Burlington was liable for Slowik's conduct. See id. at 1116, 1120.
The three bases for liability are: 1) when the tort is committed within the scope of
employment, 2) employers are liable for their own negligence or recklessness, and 3)
masters are liable when the servant relies on "apparent authority" or is assisted in
accomplishing the tort by the agency relationship. See id. As to the scope of
employment rule, sexual harassment, of course, is not within anyone's job description.
Forbidden conduct, however, may be considered within the scope of someone's
employment ifthe person intends to serve the employer. See id. at 1116.
223. See id. at 1115.
224. Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1116.
225. See id. at 1117.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1118.
229. See id. at 1118, 1124.
230. See id. at 1117.
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not have taken steps to correct the harassment. 231 Therefore,
the court concluded, Burlington could not be found negligent or
reckless in failing to correct the hostile work environment. 232
However, Ellerth responded by arguing that Burlington was
.vicariously liable because Slowik was a decision-maker in the
company.233 If Slowik was a decision-maker in the company,
she argued, his knowledge of the hostile environment could be
imputed to Burlington. 234 The court found this argument unpersuasive because Slowik, while a vice president, was not high
enough in the corporate hierarchy to be considered a "decisionmaker.''235 Therefore, Burlington could not be liable for
Slowik's conduct under this theory. 236
Under the third agency theory of liability, Burlington would
be liable if Slowik was assisted by the agency relation when he
harassed Ellerth.237 The district court reasoned that an employee is assisted by the agency relation when he purports to
act for the employer and someone relies on this assertion of
apparent authority.236 On the surface, this basis seemed to be
successful for Ellerth because Slowik told her he could make
her life at Burlington very easy or very hard, depending on her
reaction to him.239 Thus, it appeared that Slowik did rely on his
authority as a supervisor when he harassed her.240 The court
stated, however, that a person who knows the limits of the employee's (in this case, the supervisor's) authority could not subject the employer to liability. 241 Ellerth knew that Burlington
did not authorize Slowik's conduct because she knew it had an

231. See id. at 1118.
232. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1118.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1119. An affidavit from Slowik's superior, Salvatore Porio, showed
that, while Slowik had some decision· making authority, he was not part of the upper
management who had decision-making and policy-making authority for the whole
company. [d. at 1119 n.14.
236. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1119.
237. See id. at 1120.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1120.
241. See id.
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explicit policy against sexual harassment. 242 Ellerth possessed
a copy of the policy and had read it.243 Based on these facts, the
court concluded that she could not impose vicarious liability on
Burlington under this theory. 244
Finally, the court addressed Ellerth's constructive discharge
claim. 245 Constructive discharge occurs only when an employer
"makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that
the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation. "246 For
reasons similar to those articulated in the agency discussion,
the court found that Ellerth could not claim she was constructively discharged. 247 Specifically, the court found that Burlington could not have made Ellerth's working conditions intolerable because it was not aware that she was being harassed. 248
Because Ellerth could not demonstrate Burlington's liability
for Slowik's harassment, the district court granted Burlington's
motion for summary judgment. 249 The court dismissed her action with prejudice. 250

B.

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

1.

The Panel Decision

Ellerth appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. 251 First, the panel addressed whether EIlerth's complaint was broad enough to encompass both quid pro
quo and hostile work environment claims. 252 The panel stated

242. See id. at 1121.
243. See id.
244. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1121.
245. See id. at 1124.
246. Id. (citing Weihaupt v. American Med. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 426 (7th Cir.
1989)).
247. See id.
248. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1124.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See Ellerth 11,102 F.3d at 848.
252. See id. at 854·855. See also discussion infra part II.D. for a discussion of the
terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment."
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that the same actions that create a hostile work environment
can encompass a quid pro quo demand.253 For example,
Slowik's persistent harassment of Ellerth, in the form of unwanted touching and sexual remarks, created a hostile working
environment.254 Because some of this harassment consisted of
threats to make Ellerth's work more difficult if she rebuffed'
Slowik, her claims also encompassed a quid pro quo demand. 255
Moreover, neither Title VII nor the EEOC demand that a
plaintiff plead the particular theory of sexual harassment.256
Applying this reasoning to Ellerth's circumstances, the panel
found that Slowik repeatedly linked his sexual demands to EIlerth's working conditions. 257 Therefore, the court found that
Ellerth's complaint encompassed allegations of quid pro quo
and hostile environment harassment.258
Second, the panel discussed whether the district court properly applied agency principles. 259 The panel applied the "scope
of employment" rule that conduct arising out of an employee's
responsibilities is within the scope of employment, even if the
particular conduct was forbidden by the employer. 260 Applying
this rule to Ellerth's case, the panel focused on several important facts. 261 First, Slowik's harassing conduct occurred during
working hours and in the work environment. 262 Even when
Ellerth and Slowik were not in the office, they were conducting
company business.263 Second, Slowik had substantial authority
to alter Ellerth's working conditions. 264 Burlington gave Slowik
the authority to hire, to promote, and to assign work to EI-

253. See id. at 855. Conversely, the court stated, the victim of a quid pro quo
demand is, by definition, the victim of a hostile working environment. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 855.
256. See id.
257. See id. (describing the threats Slowik made and the instances in which he
refused his approval of customer orders unless Ellerth cooperated with his demands or
answered personal questions).
258. See id. at 863.
259. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 856.
260. See id. at 858.
261. See id. at 859.
262. See id.
263. See Ellerth 11,102 F.3d at 859.
264. See id.
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lerth.265 His sexual demands were linked to these responsibilities, making her tolerance of them a condition of her employment.266 Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the panel
found that Slowik acted within the scope of his employment
when he harassed Ellerth.267 As a result, the court found that
Burlington could be vicariously liable for Slowik's conduct, and
reversed the grant of summary judgment.268

2.

The En Bane Decision

Burlington petitioned for rehearing en banc and the Seventh Circuit granted the petition on January 28, 1997.269 The
case was reargued en banc on February 25, 1997, resulting in
eight different opinions because the court could not agree on
the proper standard for employer liability in sexual harassment cases.270 A majority of the court afill"Illed the district
court's grant of summary judgment against Ellerth's claim of
hostile environment harassment and reversed the district court
in favor of her claim of quid pro quo harassment.271 Thus, the
majority found that Ellerth did not state sufficient facts to proceed on her claim of hostile environment harassment, but could
proceed on a claim of quid pro quo harassment. 272

265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See Ellerth 11,102 F.3d at 859.
268. See id. at 859-860.
269. See id. at 863. Upon rehearing, Ellerth's case was consolidated with that of
Alice Jansen, a similarly situated plaintiff. The case does not indicate why the petition
for rehearing was granted.
270. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam). The opinion does not indicate which judge authored the per curiam opinion.
Judges Cudahy and Kanne's opinion addressed only Jansen's claims of sexual
harassment. See supra note 266. The other judges held as follows: Chief Judge Posner
and Judges Manion and Coffey did not fmd that Ellerth's evidence of quid pro quo
harassment could survive summary judgment. Chief Judge Posner and Judge Manion
advocated a Ucompany acts" standard for quid pro quo claims, which essentially
required more than unfulfilled threats. Judge Coffey advocated a negligence standard
for all sexual harassment claims and could not fmd sufficient proof of Burlington's
negligence. The remaining judges (Flaum, Easterbrook, and Wood) concurred in the
judgment of the court, although they came to that conclusion in different ways. See id.
at 494.
271. See id.
272. See id.
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Burlington then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for certiorari. 273 The Court granted certiorari "to assist
in defming the relevant standards of employer liability. "274
V.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

Burlington Industries v. Ellerth was an attempt to reconcile
the past, represented by Meritor, with the then current cases
existing in the federal circuits. Prior to Ellerth, the federal circuits were split regarding how employers were to be held liable
for sexual harassment under Title VII. 275 As the Ellerth Court
observed, the problem was not simply "what standard should
be applied" but also the application of agency principles that
lay beneath the standard. 276 The agency analysis was a significant problem because the various federal courts interpreted
agency principles differently. 277 The Supreme Court had never
before articulated the appropriate agency analysis and, in Ellerth, had the opportunity to break new ground in Title VII
sexual harassment cases.
A.

THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES TO
SEXUAL HARAsSMENT

The central issue before the Court was whether an employer
should be vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by one of its supervisors.278 The Court applied three rules
from section 219 of the Restatement of Agency, focusing on the

273. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998).
274. [d. at 2264.
275. See e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (imposing
vicarious liability only for quid pro quo harassment claims); Karibian v. Columbia
Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying vicarious liability to both hostile
environment and quid pro quo claims); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979) (applying tniditional agency principles to find vicarious liability when the
harasser is a supervisor).
276. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998).
277. See generally Henson, 682 F.2d 897 (imposing vicarious liability only for quid
pro quo harassment claims); Karibian, 14 F.3d 773 (applying vicarious liability to both
hostile environment and quid pro quo claims); Miller, 600 F.2d 211 (applying
traditional agency principles to fmd vicarious liability when the harasser is a
supervisor ).
278. See Burlington. 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
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scope of employment rule, negligence, and the agency relation
standard. 279
The Court fIrst applied the scope of employment rule, which
states that employers are vicariously liable for torts committed
by their employees when the employees are acting within the
.scope of their employment.280 Under the scope of employment
rule, employers may be liable for both the negligent and intentional torts of their employees. 281 The Court stated that sexual
harassment is intentional conduct, and applied the scope of
employment rule for intentional conduct. 282
Employer liability for intentional conduct arises when the
employee's intent, "however misguided, is wholly or in part to
further the employer's business."283 Therefore, even when conduct, such as sexual harassment, is forbidden, an employer will
be liable where its employee intended to serve the employer. 284
The general rule, according to Title VII case law, is that sexual
harassment is not within the scope of a supervisor's employment because harassers act according to their own motives,
with no intent to serve the employer. 285 Therefore, because
Slowik was not acting to serve Burlington, Ellerth could not
assert that Slowik acted within the scope of his employment
when he harassed her. 286
The Court then discussed the second basis for employer liability, negligence. 287 Under the negligence standard of section
219(2)(b), Ellerth would have to prove that Burlington knew or
should have known that a hostile environment existed as a re-

279. See id. at 2266-2268. Note that negligence is not a basis for vicarious liability.
Rather, in the sexual harassment context, an employer would be liable for its own
negligence in failing to prevent or correct sexual harassment. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (2) cmt. e (1957) (stating that, unlike the other standards,
negligence is the standard when the employer is guilty of tortious conduct).
280. See id. at 2266.
281. See id.
282. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
283. [d.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 2267.
286. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
287. See id.
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sult of Slowik's conduct, and that it failed to take reasonable
steps to stop the harassment.288 Thus, even if a supervisor's
motives were entirely personal (i.e., he was acting outside the
scope of his employment), his employer would be liable if it
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to
prevent or correct it. 289 The Court noted that negligence is the
minimum standard of liability imposed by Title VII. 290 However, because Ellerth did not assert a claim under the negligence standard, the Court did not consider the issue. 291
The Court then discussed whether the third basis for liability, the agency relation standard, would allow Ellerth to impose
vicarious liability.292 The agency relation standard, stated in
section 219(2Xd), applies when the supervisor misuses the
authority delegated to him by the employer. 293 This rule, the
Court noted, is potentially very broad and could cover most of
the torts that occur in a workplace. 294 Since Meritor limits employer liability, however, the agency relation standard cannot
be read so broadly as to cover all harassment in the workplace. 295 The Court then had to identify the point at which vicarious liability would apply. 296

1.
Agency Principles Demand Vicarious Liability Where a
Tangible Employment Action was Taken Against the Employee
Following the agency relation standard, vicarious liability is
most clearly appropriate when the supervisor takes action
against the employee, usually in the form of termination or denial of a raise or promotion. 297 The Court stated that all of the

288. See id. (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (2)(b) (1957)).
See also discussion supra Part III.B.2.
289. See id.
290. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 2268.
293. See id. See also discussion supra Part II.B.2.
294. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
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Courts of Appeals that had addressed this issue found vicarious
liability in cases where the employee suffered economic injury
in the form of a tangible employment action. 298 Indeed, the
Court stated that an employer becomes strictly liable when an
employee suffers such an economic injury. 299
The rationale for imposing vicarious liability where the employee suffered economic injury centers on the employer's relationship with its supervisors.300 Generally, only supervisors
can cause economic injuries because the employer vests
authority in the supervisor to make decisions (such as hiring,
termination, promotion, and giving raises) that economically
impact the employees below him.SOI In making decisions that
are within his authority, the supervisor invokes the official
power of the employer. 302 Thus, the decision to terminate an
employee, for example, is a "comp~ act. H303 The potential
clearly exists for the supervisor to misuse his power when
making these kinds of decisions. 304 Accordingly, when a decision to terminate is based on sexual harassment, the company
is vicariously liable under Title VII. 306 Since Ellerth did not
suffer a tangible employment action, however, the Court went
on to discuss the rationale for imposing vicarious liability when
no such action was taken against the employee. 306

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits." Id.
298. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. For the purposes of this discussion, the
reader should assume that "tangible employment action" refers to "hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change of benefits." Id.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 2269.
301. See id.
302. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265, 2269. Ellerth did not suffer a tangible
employment action because the threats Slowik made to her were not carried out. See
id. See also discussion supra Part III for a more detailed description of the threats
Slowik made regarding Ellerth's employment at Burlington.
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2.
The Rationale for Imposing Vicarious Liability When No
Tangible Employment Action Was Taken Against the Employee
Whether vicarious liability exists in the absence of a tangible employment action is a more complicated issue because the
supervisor's conduct in harassing an employee is not as clearly
connected to the employer. 307 The Court warned that the language of the agency relation standard can be read to limit or
expand the potential for vicarious liability because, in a sense,
a supervisor is always aided by the agency relation when he
commits a tort against a subordinate. 308 On the one hand, the
fact that a supervisor's power has a threatening character that
enables him to commit harassment could be a reason to expand
employer liability.309 Employees sense that the supervisor is
"clothed with the employer's authority" and, further, that he
abuses his authority when he sexually harasses a subordinate.310

On the other hand, sexual harassment that does not result
in a tangible employment action often consists of behavior that
co-workers can engage in, and the supervisor's status, therefore, makes little diffe~ence to the employee. 311 In these circumstances, it may not be appropriate to apply vicarious liability automatically, because it could lead to strict vicarious
liability for sexual harassment regardless of the harasser's position in the company.312 Because of this tension, as well as
Meritor's demand that agency principles be read to limit the
imposition of vicarious liability, the Ellerth court declined to
automatically impose vicarious liability in the absence of a tangible employment consequence. 313

307. See id. at 2269.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring».
311. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
312. See id. at 2270.
313. See id.
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B.

THE COURT'S HOLDING

The Court ultimately held that, in cases where the employee
did not suffer tangible employment consequences, the employer
is subject to vicarious liability unless it can prove an affirmative defense. 314 The Court further defined the affIrmative defense as consisting of two elements. 315 The fIrst element requires the employer to prove it took reasonable action to prevent and correct the harassment. 316 If it did, the second element requires the employer to prove that the employee-victim
unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective measures
available to her.317 If the employer proves both elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, it is not vicariously liable for a
hostile work environment created by one of its supervisors. 318
Thus, Burlington was subject to vicarious liability for
Slowik's creation of a hostile environment. 319 However, because
Ellerth did not allege that she suffered a tangible employment
action, on remand, Burlington may assert the affirmative defense the Court established.32O

314. See id.
315. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See id. In proving the first element of the defense, the existence of a sexual
harassment policy is not necessary as a matter of law, but whether a policy exists is
relevant. The existence of a policy, as a practical matter, notifies employees of their
opportunity to come forward with complaints of harassment. Interview with David B.
Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ. School of Law, in San Francisco,
Cal. (Oct. 27,1998). Accordingly, an employee's failure to use her employer's complaint
procedure "will normally suffice to satisfY the employer's burden under the second
element of the defense." [d.
319. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2271.
320. See id.
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C.
THE COURT REJECTED A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO
DETERMINING EMPLOYER LIABILITY

Much of the reasoning behind the Court's holding involved
the use of the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment"
in sexual harassment cases. 321 Specifically, the Court addressed whether the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" should determine the imposition of vicarious liability.322 This issue was before the Court because the district
court upheld the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile
environment harassment which determined whether vicarious
liability would apply.323 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit panel
applied traditional agency principles and found Burlington liable based on the scope of employment rule. 324 The Seventh
Circuit, en bane, was split on whether Burlington was vicariously liable. 325 Thus, the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to reject the use of "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" as
categories of harassment that determined the standard for employer liability.326 The Court took this opportunity, and held
that the terms were not useful for formulating a standard of
employer liability. 327
To illustrate its point, the Court noted that a trier of fact
could find threats of retaliation in Slowik's remarks to EIlerth. 328 However, Slowik's failure to carry out his threats
would remove Ellerth's claim from the quid pro quo category of
sexual harassment.329 If Slowik had carried out his threats,
Ellerth would have had a claim of quid pro quo harassment,
which automatically subjects the employer to vicarious liabil321. See id. at 2265.
322. See id.
323. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(pointing out that there is a doctrinal inconsistency in imposing vicarious liability for
quid pro quo harassment but not for hostile environment harassment). In keeping
with that inconsistency, the district court applied a negligence standard to EIierth's
hostile environment claim. See id. at 1117.
324. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848, 863 (7th Cir. 1996).
325. See Ellerth Ill, 123 F.3d 490.
326. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 2265. Rather, Ellerth's claim would be one of hostile environment
harassment. See id.
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ity.330 Because prior cases held out the promise of vicarious
liability only in quid pro quo cases, Ellerth only pressed her
quid pro quo claim when she sought to impose vicarious liability on Burlington. 331
However, Ellerth's quid pro quo claim was not very strong
because she did not suffer a tangible employment action such
as termination or denial of a raise or promotion. 332 Thus, one of
the issues facing the district court was whether Ellerth's claim
was really one of hostile environment sexual harassment with
a quid pro quo component. 333 The Supreme Court resolved this
issue by stating that the type of claim was not dispositive in
determining whether employers could be vicariously liable for
sexual harassment. 334 Rather, a determination of vicarious liability would depend on whether the employer could satisfy the
affirmative defense the Court established. 335
The Court noted several justifications for its rejection of the
categorical approach. 336 First, the terms do not appear in the
text of Title VII, indicating that Congress did not intend for
liability to depend on the type of claim.337 Rather, the terms
fIrst appeared in academic literature and were used to describe
conduct that amounted to sexual harassment. 338 Second, the
terms served only a limited purpose in Meritor, where the Supreme Court was deciding whether sexual harassment constituted employment discrimination. 339 Essentially, for the Meritor Court, determining the type of the claim was a threshold
question of whether sexual harassment had occurred. 340 In

330. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
331. See id. at 2271. Prior cases did not impose vicarious liability for hostile
environment cases. See discussion infra Part II.D.l.
332. See id. at 2264, 2265.
333. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1121. The problem with a "hybrid" claim was, of
course, that the court would not know which standard to apply if the type of claim
determined whether vicarious liability would apply. See id.
334. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
335. See id. at 2270.
336. See id. at 2264-2265.
337. See id. at 2264-2265 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
338. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979)).
339. See id.
340. See id. at 2265.
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Meritor, the terms were not used to determine the standard for
employer liability; that question was resolved by the application of agency principles. 341 Therefore, the Ellerth Court was
not bound by precedent that imposed different standards depending on the type of claim. 342
. Accordingly, the Ellerth Court outlined principles for imposing vicarious liability that did not depend on the labels
"hostile environment" and "quid pro quO."343 The Court's holding requires vicarious liability when a tangible employment
action was taken and allows for vicarious liability in a hostile
environment-type situation.344 However, unlike a tangible employment action case, in a hostile work environment case, employers will be able to assert the affrrmative defense the Court
established. 345 Because employers could be vicariously liable in
a hostile environment case, the Court held that Ellerth should
have had the opportunity to prove she had a claim for which
Burlington may be held liable. 346 It therefore remanded EIlerth's case to the district court, where Burlington could assert
the affIrmative defense.347
VI. CRITIQUE: AGENCY PRINCIPLES DEMAND VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN ALL CASES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY A SUPERVISOR
A.

THE ELLERTH RULE IS CONTRARY TO THE AGENCY
PRINCIPLES STATED IN SECTION 219 OF THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth provided the ideal vehicle for articulating the proper application of agency principles
in determining employer liability for sexual harassment because Ellerth's claims did not comfortably fit into the prior

341. See id. at 2264.
342. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
343. See id. at 2265-2270. See also discussion supra Part II.D.
344. See id. at 2270.
345. See id.
346. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 227l.
347. See id.
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rules. 348 Specifically, Ellerth's claims were a blend of hostile
environment and quid pro quo harassment, illustrating the artificial nature of the distinction between the two types of claims
as it applied to employer liability. 349
The Court wisely used Ellerth's case to reject the use of
"quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" as dispositive categories in sexual harassment cases. 35O In so doing, the Court
opened the door to plaintiffs like Kimberly Ellerth, whose
claims do not fall comfortably into either category.351 At the
heart of the Court's rejection of the categories is the recognition
that vicarious employer liability should not depend entirely on
what kind of harassment the plaintiff suffered when she, was
harassed by her supervisor. 352
If labeling claims as "quid pro quo" or "hostile environment"
no longer determines the standard of employer liability, the
Court should establish a bright line rule, imposing vicarious
liability in all cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. 353
Instead of relying on Meritor to limit employer liability, the
Court should have followed the agency analysis as articulated
in the 1980 EEOC guidelines, which imposed vicarious liability
in all cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. 354

One shortcoming of the Ellerth rule is that the type of harassment a plaintiff suffered will still, in large part, determine
whether the employer will be vicariously liable. 355 It is true
that categorizing a plaintifl's claim as quid pro quo or hostile
environment no longer determines the imposition of vicarious

348. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ.
School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 27, 1998).
349. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998).
350. See id.
351. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(stating that Ellerth's is essentially a hostile environment claim with a quid pro quo
component).
352. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
353. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 153.
354. See id. See also discussion supra section II.B.
355. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ.
School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 27, 1998).
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liability.356 The practical result of the Court's holding, however,
is that whether a plaintiff suffered some form of economic injury determines whether she can hold her employer vicariously
liable. 357 Without a tangible employment action, the employer
will have the opportunity to defeat the imposition of vicarious
liability.358 Thus, despite the Court's rejection of the categorical
approach, in reality, its decision perpetuated the distinction
between quid pro quo and hostile environment claims.
Under the Ellerth rule, vicarious liability is automatic when
the employee suffers a tangible employment action. 359 Because
quid pro quo sexual harassment, by definition, results in a tangible employment action against the victim, vicarious liability
will automatically apply.360 If, instead, the employee did not
suffer a tangible employment action, vicarious liability is not
automatic because the employer may assert the affirmative
defense. 361 In the latter case, the employee, by defmition, was
the victim of hostile work environment harassment. 362 As a
result, the Court's holding is little more than a change in vocabulary.
Another problem with the Ellerth rule is its inconsistency
with agency principles. 363 Had the Court adhered more closely
to section 219 in its agency application, the Court would not
have established the affirmative defense. 364 Indeed, the Court
noted that the agency relation standard appeared to cover most
of the misconduct that occurs in the workplace. 365 Unfortu-

356. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
357. See id. at 2270.
358. See id. ("When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer
may raise an affirmative defense .... ") (emphasis added).
359. See id.
360. See Henson v. City of Dundee 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing 29
C.F.R. 1604.11(a)(1)(2)).
361. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
362. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
363. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ.
School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 27, 1998).
364. See id.
365. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
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nately, the court declined to follow this line of reasoning to its
logical result. 366
B.

APPLYING THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND AGENCY
RELATION STANDARDS LEAD TO STRICT VICARIOUS LIABILITY
FOR SEXUAL HARAsSMENT COMMITTED BY A SUPERVISOR

There are at least two bases, found in Section 219, for imposing vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases. 367 First,
sexual harassment is within a supervisor's scope of employment because he is responsible for the work environment he
oversees. 366 For example, Slowik's duties included supervising
Ellerth's work. 369 Ellerth's work served Burlington's interests.370 Consequently, Slowik's supervision of those tasks were
also for Burlington's benefit and therefore were within the
scope of his employment. 371
Moreover, a supervisor's responsibility is not limited to personnel decisions; he is also charged with maintaining a safe
and productive work environment. 372
Sexual harassment

366. See id. at 2270 (stating that Meritor required the Court to use agency
principles to limit employer liability for sexual harassment committed by ~upervisors).
367. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44 at 98-99 (describing three bases for imposing
vicarious liability for sexual harassment by supervisors).
368. See id. at 80. There are at least three definitions of scope of employment. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957), which defines scope of employment
as: "1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: a) it is of
the kind he is employed to perform; b) it occurs substantially within the authorized
time and space limits; c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master, and d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of
force is not unexpectable by the master." Alternatively, Seavey states that conduct is
within the scope of employment "if it can be said rationally that the employment is the
primary cause of the tort." WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF AGENCY §
87 cmt. a (1964). Prosser and Keeton state that scope of employment encompasses
"acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so
fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even
though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment." W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 70 at 502 (5th ed.
1984).
369. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848,859-860 (7th Cir. 1996),
vacated en bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
370. See id.
371. See id.
372. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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clearly impacts both the safety and productivity of the work
environment.373
Sexual harassment is readily analogous to other conduct
which has been found to be within the scope of employment. 374
Horseplay is one example. 375 In Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk
Mills,376 the New York Court of Appeals found that horseplay
between employees was within the scope of employment because it should be expected. 377 The employer should have expected the workmen in its factory to engage in pranks and
jokes because such conduct from the men was "inseparable
from factory life."378 Thus, foreseeability, in part, determines
whether conduct is within the scope of employment. 379
Similarly, sexual harassment is a known problem in the
workplace. 380 Sexual innuendoes, advances, and harassment
characterize the modern workplace just as pranks between factory workers were a characteristic of workplaces in the 1920s.
That so many employers today have policies prohibiting sexual
harassment indicates that employers expect harassment to oc-

373. See 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 46.01(2) (Matthew Bender, 1998)
(citing SandrofT, Se:cual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988
at 69.) "A typical Fortune 500 company spends as much as $6.7 million a year in
sexual harassment costs due to absenteeism, turnover and lost productivity.n [d. See
also Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence ~ainst Women in the
Workplace, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, Oct. 1993 at 1072 (describing the consequences
of sexual harassment to employers and victims).
374. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2286·2287 (1998).
375. See e.g., Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920)
(employer was found vicariously liable for an eye injury sustained by an employee
when another employee threw an apple at him). Judge Cardozo described horseplay in
that case as " ... a moment of diversion from work to joke with or playa prank upon a
fellow workman. n [d. See also Blunk v. Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. Co., 217 P.2d 494, 495
(Cal. 1950) (describing horseplay as "sportive actsn). These definitions are not meant to
suggest that sexual harassment involves the same kind of prankish behavior that
occurred in these cases. Rather, the use of horseplay cases is merely to illustrate the
fact that such conduct, like sexual harassment, is foreseeable by the employer.
376. 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920).
377. See Leonbruno, 128 N.E. at 711.
378. [d.
379. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (describing cases that used a broad
definition of "scope of employment n).
380. See id. at 2288.
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cur. 381 The fact that employers can foresee and prevent sexual
harassment in the workplace is therefore a basis for imposing
vicarious liability.
Second, the agency relation standard, as Ellerth makes
clear, appears to cover a broad range of workplace misconduct. 382 The agency relation standard imposes vicarious liability when an employee is able to commit the tort because of his
employment.383 The supervisor's ability to harass his subordinate is "facilitated by [his] position of authority."384 Without his
supervisory position, he would not have leverage over the employees he supervises. 385 He is able to call employees into his
office for meetings, reprimands, or other work-related discussions. 386 In the course of these interactions, the supervisor has
the opportunity to sexually harass his subordinate. 387 The fact
that someone in authority is subjecting a worker to harassment
reinforces an employee's reluctance to resist advances or complain. 388 Thus, contrary to the Court's opinion, a broad reading
of the agency relation standard is appropriate in sexual harassment cases.

Ellerth provides several examples of how a supervisor's relationship with the employer helps the supervisor commit harassment. 389 First, Slowik told Ellerth that he could "make [her]
life very hard or very easy at Burlington."390 In making this
threat, Slowik undeniably relied on the power delegated to him
by Burlington. The fact that Slowik did not actually terminate,
demote, or deny r~ises to Ellerth is immaterial because he had

381. See 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 46.01(2) (Matthew Bender, 1998)
(citing Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988
at 69, 71). Of 160 Fortune 500 companies, 76% had written policies prohibiting sexual
harassment. See id.
382. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
383. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957).
384. Alan Q. Sykes, The &undaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 606
(1988).
385. See id. at 606-607.
386. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 88.
387. See id.
388. See id. at 88-89. See also Sykes, supra note 384, at 606.
389. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107.
390. Id.
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already linked the conditions of her employment to her tolerance of his advances. 391 Then, Slowik made Ellerth's life at
Burlington "very hard" by continuing to harass her.392 Second,
Slowik's reluctance to promote Ellerth because she was "not
loose enough" demonstrates his wilJjngness to use his supervisory power against her if she did not accept advances. 393 Third,
the fact that Slowik could pursue Ellerth for so long illustrates
the coercive power of a supervisor's authority; she was too
afraid of what would happen to her if she complained to anyone
at Burlington.394
VII.

CONCLUSION

As Ellerth's case demonstrates, the Supreme Court took the

necessary step of rejecting "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" harassment as categories for determining the standard of employer liability. 395 Thus, under Ellerth, plaintiffs
whose claims do not comfortably fit into one of these two categories may still be able to impose vicarious liability on their
employers. Unfortunately, the Court failed to precisely apply
thE:. proper scope of employment and agency relation standards.
A precise application of these .standards demands vicarious liability in all cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. The
Supreme Court in Ellerth adopted Meritor's dictum that agency
principles limited employer liability, and therefore declined to
properly apply agency principles to Kimberly Ellerth's

391. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,778 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
Urban's threats to terminate Karibian if she did not comply with his sexual demands
amounted to sexual harassment because he "linked tangible job benefits to the
acceptance or rejection of sexual advances. n The fact that Karibian was promoted, and
not terminated, did not change the analysis). Similarly, in Ellerth's case, Slowik linked
tangible job benefits (continued employment, making her life at Burlington easy or
difficult) to Ellerth's acceptance or rejection of his advances. See Ellerth, 912 F. Supp.
at 1107, 1108 (describing Slowk's threat to make Ellerth's life easy or difficult, his
hesitations about promoting Ellerth because she was not "loose enoughn and his denial
of her request for a special customer order because she would not describe what she
was wearing).
392. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1106·1109 (describing Slowik's harassment of
Ellerth).
393. Id. at 1108.
394. See id. at 1117.
395. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998).
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claims. 396 As a result, a bright-line standard of employer liability in Title VII sexual harassment cases continues to elude
courts and commentators in this important area of law.
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